Proof systems
A settlement batch's proof system determines what (if anything) a batch carries to demonstrate correctness. The RDK supports four, and ties each to a settlement paradigm through the compatibility matrix.
| Proof system | Used by | What a batch carries |
|---|---|---|
fraud | optimistic | No proof on submission; a fraud proof is supplied only if the batch is challenged |
snark | zk | A SNARK validity proof, verified on-chain |
stark | zk | Paused: refused by the chain from v3.2.8 (see below) |
none | based, sovereign | No proof |
fraud (optimistic)
Optimistic batches are submitted without a proof and finalize after the
challenge window. If a batch is challenged, the operator responds with an
interactive fraud proof. See Lifecycles for the
SUBMITTED → CHALLENGED → REJECTED path.
snark (zk)
ZK batches carry a validity proof in the batch's proof field. ZK settlement
requires a valid proof, and on-chain verification gates finalization:
a batch only finalizes once the network's verifier accepts its proof.
The chain verifies the proof against the rollup's verification key: a Groth16
BLS12-381 verifying key in gnark's binary encoding, for a circuit with exactly
four public inputs (prev_state_root, state_root, data_hash,
withdrawals_root). From chain v3.2.7 the creator registers it with
setVerificationKey (or verificationKey on createRollup), before the
rollup's first batch; after that only governance can replace it.
Canonical public inputs (chain v3.2.8). Each public input is read as a 32-byte big-endian integer, and the chain refuses a batch whose input is not already below the BLS12-381 scalar modulus. A raw SHA-256 or SHAKE-256 output is above it about half the time, so:
- commit to state with a field-friendly hash, or reduce with
toCanonicalScalarand prove the reduced value; data_hashis exempt when the chain fixed it (a based rollup's inbox range, or a native-DA hash of posted data); otherwise reduce it too;withdrawals_rootmay be any 32 bytes: the chain stores it reduced modulo the scalar field and pays a withdrawal when the rebuilt tree root matches it modulo the field. The batch view'swithdrawalsRootReducedsays so; compare roots withwithdrawalsRootMatches;zkPublicInputsreturns the four inputs, reduced, in the circuit's order;- check a batch before paying the fee with
zkPublicInputErrors;submitBatchdoes this for you when it can read the rollup.
import type { SubmitBatchInput } from "@qorechain/rdk";
const input: SubmitBatchInput = {
rollupId: "my-defi-rollup",
batchIndex: 0,
stateRoot: "0x...",
prevStateRoot: "0x...",
txCount: 1,
proof: "0x...", // the Groth16 proof bytes
};
The exact proof encoding is defined by the chain's on-chain verifier; align your prover's output with it. The RDK transports the proof bytes — it does not implement, describe, or second-guess the verifier.
stark (paused)
From chain v3.2.8 a STARK verification key cannot be set and a STARK rollup's
batches are refused: the only statement the chain's STARK verifier implements
does not constrain a rollup's roots, withdrawals or data. STARK settlement
returns when the chain verifies a real rollup statement. Governance can move an
existing STARK rollup to a Groth16 key. The RDK keeps stark as a known value
so such rollups can be read, and its validation refuses it for new ones.
none (based / sovereign)
Based and sovereign batches carry no proof. For based settlement, inclusion is inherited from host-chain proposers; for sovereign settlement, correctness is established by the rollup's own consensus off the Main Chain.
The compatibility matrix
The settlement paradigm fixes the allowed proof system. The RDK enforces this before any batch is submitted:
| Settlement | Proof system |
|---|---|
optimistic | fraud |
zk | snark (stark is paused) |
based | none |
sovereign | none |
A configuration that pairs, say, optimistic settlement with snark proofs is
rejected by validation. Start from a preset to get a matching
pair by default.